This article juxtaposes two very different texts, Charles de Bovelles's Ars oppositorum (1511) and Maurice Scève's Délie (1544), examples of Latin prose philosophy and vernacular love lyric respectively. It is not a study of sources: it considers the literary text, like the Latin prose, as an instrument for thinking with. Furthermore, I suggest that contrasting conceptual possibilities arise from generic differences, so that the study of two divergent genres illuminates a variety of related conceptions of difference. I trace a shared interest in the respective roles of cognition and causality in establishing differences, but also a divergence concerning the value of difference, in particular for the human subject. Thus, in the Délie, I focus upon images of illuminating, looking, perceiving, and disintegrating. Both texts suggest that cognition is crucial to the establishment of differences, so that it even seems to usurp the function of natural causality. However, in the Délie the je suffers from difference -both difference within the self and difference from the divine -whereas in the Ars difference can be thought of as a violation but more often is perceived in Trinitarian terms, so that the human subject achieves a privileged sort of self-difference resembling that of the divine.
oppositorum (Art of Opposites) is a work of prose philosophy in Latin which offers a very unusual version of the Aristotelian square of opposites: it is a discussion of how opposites (understood most broadly as two terms placed in relation to one another, but also as antithetical pairs) can be used to produce knowledge. 2 By contrast, the Délie is a collection of vernacular love lyric. Despite these differences of genre, I have argued, the Délie and the Ars share an interest in various kinds of difference both within and between pairs of 'opposite' terms; in particular, both texts undermine antithetical difference by confusing it with other kinds, profoundly challenging the categorization of differences which was so central to Aristotelian logic. 3 In this essay I will suggest that both texts are also concerned with the relation of 'opposition' (or difference) to causality and to cognition, to the natural and to the human. Both explore the role of the human subject in establishing difference, and imply that human cognition may be very powerful, so that it even seems to usurp the function of natural causality. However, ultimately the Délie and the Ars diverge in their assessment of the value of difference, both in general and for the human subject in particular.
My aim in reading a poetic text alongside a theoretical one is not to construct a univocal account of Renaissance conceptions of difference, or to consider philosophy as a source for poetry. 4 Instead, I will locate not only the convergences but also the divergences between the Délie and the Ars. Indeed, the generic differences between the two texts mean that they provided contrasting possibilities for conceiving difference, and illuminate contrasting possible ways of thinking about opposition and sameness in early sixteenth-century France. Some divergences arise from the fact that, while love lyric explores particular terms which it often places in opposition to one another, the Ars oppositorum sets out to analyse the nature and principles of opposition. More specifically for the concerns of this essay, the Ars, in common with much sixteenth-century prose philosophy, tends to refer to 'man' -or to the human intellectus ('understanding'/ 'perception') -in the abstract singular; by contrast, love lyric depicts both a je and also a tu or elle; as I will discuss, this dissimilarity between the Ars and the Délie is central to their contrasting presentations of difference in the human subject.
Cognition and causality: the 'intellectus' and nature in the ' Ars oppositorum' Bovelles explains in his first chapter that oppositions can derive either from nature or from reason: his first subheading states (using a spatial image typical of his writing) that 'we call opposites things placed facing each other, turned towards one another, separated by the distance of either a natural or a rational line'.
5 Opposites include, for Bovelles, all things placed in relation to one another 'either by nature or by the intellectus' (p. 36). Oppositions of substance (substantia) and/or the thing (res) stem from nature, whereas oppositions of reasoning (ratio) arise from the intellectus.
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Bovelles's first chapter emphasizes at some length that the human intellectus cannot alter the nature or substance of things -it cannot divide them or put them together; the intellectus cannot 'create' or 'engender' anything. Instead it adds rationes ('reasonings') to things, producing conceptions which originate from the mind (as distinguished from that which results from nature). Therefore, the process of human reasoning embedded in Bovelles's square of opposites -while described as creative 8 -is presented as one of cognition in contradistinction to those of genuine creation.
However, although Bovelles has stated in his first chapter that opposites can be 'rational' or natural, later in the Ars (especially in Chapters 4 and 7), Bovelles suggests that opposition is not natural. In the fourth chapter he says that in nature all things are in relations of identity to themselves rather than relations of 5 'Opposita dicuntur contra se posita, in alterutrum conversa, interstite aut naturali aut rationali dyametro distantia': Bovelles, Ars oppositorum, ed. by Pierre Magnard (Paris: Vrin, 1984), p. 36. I refer throughout to Magnard's edition; translations into English are my own, although I have consulted Magnard's French translation. All italics are my own.
6 Bovelles also treats the intellectus in the Liber de intellectu and the De sapiente in particular (both published together with the Ars in 1511). I restrict myself here to the Ars oppositorum, where the intellectus is discussed in its relation to opposition. Bovelles's conception of the human subject, and the importance therein of cognition, have been analysed in a number of studies focusing on the De sapiente: see Emmanuel Faye, Philosophie et perfection de l'homme: de la Renaissance à Descartes (Paris, Vrin, 1998) The intellectus has, however, although sterile and infertile as far as substance is concerned, some force and fertility of its own, by which it can be called creator of rationes (reasonings); it adds, you see, to the things themselves its own rationes, which it derives, contains and grasps. The conception which is in the human intellectus is the fruit and offspring of the human intellectus and the mind's own work, not the work of nature alone': 'Nam intellectus rerum opposition to other things; indeed the fourth chapter is entitled 'That all things have been made by nature in identity, and none in opposition'. 9 Furthermore, Bovelles tends to write as if the production of oppositions might even affect nature. Whereas things in nature are 'in their own place' and never move from it, relations of opposition force things into places which are not their own (like earth into the place of fire and vice versa), and put different things into the same place (pp. 58 -60).
Chapter 7 aligns opposition with the intellectus by contradistinction to nature: all oppositions result from the intellectus rather than from nature, and 'the intellect is the opposition of the entirety of nature'. 10 The intellectus is presented as a domain in which all things are opposed, by contrast with the domain of nature in which all things are separated and identical.
11 The intellectus is a 'judge' (iudex) of all things and of their oppositions and differences. Moreover, the domains of the intellectus and nature are not entirely independent. The judging by the intellectus is necessary to nature. 12 The intellectus is represented as a sun (p. 88) or a light which illuminates nature (p. 84);
13 without this 'light', nature would be in a state of 'chaos', 'confusion', and 'mixity' (p. 84).
14 Although Bovelles repeatedly says that opposition is impossible in nature and exists only in the intellectus, the opposition of things by the intellectus is repeatedly presented as if it had a strong -and perhaps destructive -effect upon nature. Both Chapters 4 and 7 emphasize that opposition is a force (vis) or a violence inflicted upon things, and that it acts against nature (pp. 58 -60, 80-82); the terms violentum/violenta and contra naturam/nature contraria are repeated. Nature does not allow opposition, nor does it permit earth and fire to swap places, and yet in some sense the intellectus does bring things into places other than their natural ones, as if it could reorder space and the cosmic hierarchy:
The immobility and peace with which the earth below is at rest and immobile are equal to the rest and peace with which fire abides on high. And the quarrel and difficulty with which fire is maintained below are equal to the force and discord with which the earth is at rest above. Identity, therefore, and the peace of both elements, is that fire be high and earth be low. On the other hand, the quarrel and discord of both is that fire be placed and positioned below and earth above. 15 9 'Quod omnia a natura in identitate sint facta, in oppositione vero nulla' (p. 58). 10 'Si a natura nulla est oppositio, superest ut omnis oppositio sit ab intellectu' (heading of first subsection, p. 80); 'intellectus est totius nature oppositio, natura vero omnium identitas' (heading of second subsection, p. 80).
11 See in particular the subsection heading 'Omnia in mundo sunt separata et eadem, coniuncta vero sunt, et opposita in intellectu ' (p. 82) 12 See also Bovelles's De sapiente. 14 Bovelles, whose spatial metaphors are often complex and paradoxical, does not explain clearly how this depiction of nature as confusion fits with his representation of opposition as a mixing of things which is to be contrasted with the separation or non-mixing of things in nature: see in particular pp. 80 -81. The notion of a light dividing Chaos recalls God but Bovelles has earlier made it clear that he does not mean the divine intellectus, which in any case 'is nature itself ' (p. 45).
15 'quanta quiete et pace ignis sursum immobilis perseverat, tanta immobilitate et pace terra deorsum quiescit immobilis. Et quanta lite atque difficultate ignis continetur in immo, tanta vi et discordia terra quiescit in Thus Bovelles tends to write as if cognition really could affect nature, as if it might overlap in function with causality or creation. There is a strong suggestion that the human intellectus exerts power upon the world. Perhaps one might even read Bovelles's emphatic statement that the intellectus 'creates nothing and engenders nothing' as betraying doubts about any absolute distinction between cognition and causality;
16 unquestionably, at some points in the Ars oppositorum, the nature of this distinction appears to be uncertain and in doubt.
Cognition and causality: the lady's gaze and the 'je' in the 'Délie' Bovelles presents human understanding or perception (the intellectus) as a light which forcefully introduces difference into the world, which puts things into unnatural places and different things into the same place, and which reverses the cosmic hierarchy. This is comparable to Scève's 'jealous sun' dizains, in which (as I have suggested in a companion piece for the present essay) new relations of difference are introduced, and natural relations of difference, for example between day and night, are altered, so that both seem to exist in the same place, or to occupy the place of the other.
17 Importantly for my comparison with Bovelles's intellectus-light, such modifications of difference appear to be tied up with the lady's status as light; the 'jealous sun' topos and related images are common in Petrarchist lyric but, when they appear in the Délie, light tends to be emphasized, whereas in Joachim Du Bellay's Olive (1549), for example, the beneficial heat of the sun is just as prevalent.
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Furthermore, in the Délie, the lady-light can also be thought of as a locus of perception or cognition. It may be her eyes which are suns ('deux Soleils', D269).
19 Indeed there is a strong sense of similarity between the eye and the sun both in the Délie and in texts contemporary with it. It was commonplace to refer to the sun as an eye, and also to the eye as a light; Scève refers to the sun as the 'OEil du monde' (D303) and to the eye as a 'lumiere' (D7, D13). A fairly common belief held that the eye cast light during the process of vision. 20 In Leone Ebreo's Dialoghi d'amore, the 'grand bréviaire du platonisme lyonnais' and an important intertext for the Délie, 21 Philon explains at length that both the eye and the sun both illuminate and see (as do the human intellect and the divine intellect): 16 Cf. the second 'circle' of Guy Le Fèvre de La Boderie's Encyclie (1570), where the teacher-Muse corrects the secrétaire's mistake in confusing cognition and natural change, and lists the differences between them.
17 Banks, 'Opposites and Identities'. 18 'J'ay veu, Amour, (et tes beaulx traictz dorez j M'en soient tesmoings,) suyvant ma souvereine, j Naistre les fleurs de l'infertile arene j Apres ses pas dignes d'estre adorez: j Phebus honteux ses cheveulx honorez j Cacher, alors que les vents par la plaine j Eparpilloient de leur souëfve halaine j Ceulx là qui sont de fin or colorez'; L'Olive, ed. by E. Caldarini (Geneva: Droz, 1974) Bovelles develops a lengthy analogy between the celestial bodies and the human faculties, in which the sun -an 'eye' -corresponds to man or to human reason. 23 The lady in the Délie recalls the illuminating intellectus described by Bovelles in that she, firstly, both introduces or modifies difference and, secondly, constitutes not only a light but also a gaze.
However, whereas Bovelles refers to the human intellectus, in the Délie there are of course two human loci (insofar as 'human' is an accurate description of the cosmic and divinized lady-light). Moreover, the human gaze of the je is much less empowered than that of the lady. The je (like the sun) is subjected to darkness by the lady, 24 and his gaze is frequently undermined by her more powerful one: Thus, while one 'human' light or gaze (that of the lady) exerts an effect even upon the sun, another site of human perception (the je) has his light or gaze undermined by that first gaze which also affects the natural world. Difference and the human subject in the 'Délie' The je also suffers what might be described in Bovillian terms as a 'confusion' or 'mixing', or 'division'. Scève is often particularly insistent in developing Petrarchan images of melting, burning, and other forms of self-disintegration. For example, in D373, his eye dissolves and melts into tears, which become a river which freezes him and in so doing -somewhat paradoxically -'me confond', that is to say, 'mixes' and metamorphoses him.
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A son aspect mon oeil reveremment S'incline bas, tant le Coeur la revere, Et l'ayme, et craint trop perseveramment En sa rigueur benignement severe.
Car en l'ardeur si fort il persevere, Qu'il se dissoult, et tout en pleurs se fond, Pleurs restagnantz en un grand lac profond, Dont descent puis ce ruisseau argentin, Qui me congele, et ainsi me confond Tout transformé en sel Agringentin (D373) His eye also 'dissolves' in D200, and in D13 his body is reduced to cinders which the wind threatens to scatter. In several dizains, the lady-sun 'melts' him:
Comme gelée au monter du Soleil, Mon ame sens, qui toute se distille Au rencontrer le rayant de son oeil (D290) Je me deffis à si belle rencontre, Comme rousée au lever du Soleil. (D223)
Comme neige au Soleil, je me fondz (D118) Thus, in the Délie, the je is subjected by the lady-sun to fragmentation or division, and to a sort of mixing of himself. This recalls some of the terms used by Bovelles to describe the effects of the intellectus-sun upon nature. For Bovelles, opposition brings about a divisio; in addition, although nature is presented in Chapter 7 as mixed unless illuminated by the intellectus, paradoxically elsewhere we are told that nature can remain 'unmixed' only because it is involved in identity rather than opposition (which, as we have seen, is produced by the intellectus).
28 The opposition introduced by the intellectus-light brings with it both mixing and division; in both the Délie and the Ars, a human light (the lady or the intellectus) inflicts not only opposition but also, by the same token, mixing and division.
However, in the Ars oppositorum, terms like 'mixing' and 'division' apply to what occurs in some sense to nature: they appear in the discussions of cosmic 27 Defaux explains that this verb comes from the Latin confundo, and provides the following possible meanings for it: mêler, brouiller, rendre méconnaissable, métamorphoser (Délie, II, 407) .
28 See pp. 66, 76.
things being in their own place or in an unnatural place. By contrast, in the Délie, although (as discussed in the companion piece of this essay) 29 the sun is subjected to complex relations of difference, terms suggesting division and mixing refer to the effects of a perception or gaze not so much upon nature as upon the poetic subject; furthermore, in the Délie, division and mixing describe the state of this subject within himself rather than in his relations to other terms.
Difference in the ' Ars oppositorum': violence, the Trinity, and the human subject The 'division' and 'mixing' of the je in the Délie may have appealing aspects (for example, 'si belle rencontre', D223 quoted above), but it is often presented in quite anguished terms.
30 By contrast, in the Ars oppositorum the human subject has a more privileged experience of difference. The human soul does undergo some sort of separation from itself but this is expressed in very positive terms. Bovelles writes that the substance of the human soul -in common with divine and angelic substances alone -can experience true wisdom or sapientia; 31 this sapientia involves separation (discretio) of the human soul from itself but this is thought of as multiplication or development ( propagatio), which contrasts with Scève's trickling or blowing away. Thus this process in the Ars is undeniably beneficial: not only is it shared with the divine but it also involves gaining knowledge of the self; by contrast, as we have seen, the je in the Délie laments the undermining of his understanding or gaze, of his ability to know. Furthermore, although the human intellectus is in some sense divided, Bovelles also states that, in the sublunary realm, it alone is indivisible and unitary: 'it is evident [. . .] that under the heavens only the human intellectus is indivisible, truly one and immortal.' 32 The intellectus as described by Bovelles thus has a radically different relation to self-division and to knowledge from that of the human subject in the Délie.
Fernand Hallyn, in his discussion of Bovelles's De sapiente (On the Wise Man) -which was published with the Ars in 1511 and which further explores Bovelles's notion of human sapientia -suggests that the multiplication of Bovelles's human subject points to a gap inherent in representation and resemblance, that is, to a gap of difference, which, according to Hallyn, the metaphysics, the aesthetics, and the art of Bovelles's period were all striving to suppress. 33 Hallyn's analysis makes use of Freud, and is informed by modern theories of subjectivity. Indeed, for the modern reader familiar with psychoanalysis, it may be easier to accept Hallyn's notion of representation than Bovelles's alignment of self-knowledge with self-unity: in Lacan's famous mirror-stage, for example, it is by perceiving oneself that one becomes threatened by fragmentation. 34 However, Bovelles's writing does not point to this psychoanalytic conception of the human subject: if this conception is indeed suppressed, then the suppression seems very effective. Hallyn observes that Bovelles's multiplication of the human subject as 'homo-homo-homo' constitutes a 'chain' which could, in common with any chain of signifiers, be infinitely extended; its triple nature is, Hallyn indicates, arbitrary. However, as far as Bovelles is concerned, the human soul takes the form of a circle rather than a chain; 35 moreover, the tripling of the 'homo' is far from arbitrary, since it bestows upon man the Trinitarian number and therefore supports Bovelles's suggestion that difference within the human intellectus resembles that within the divine.
For Bovelles, then, the human soul can achieve a privileged sort of selfdifference or 'self-separation' which is shared only with the divine, and which appears to be distinct from the divisio that is painted in implicitly negative terms as a violence or force inflicted upon things. Such terms, though, are not distributed evenly throughout the Ars, and elsewhere even opposition within naturewhile it cannot constitute the privileged sapientia of the human subject -is described using the language of the Trinity. In the opening chapter, Bovelles explains that the two extremes of an opposition (the monad and the dyad) 'engender' a third term (the triad); this 'engendering' of a third term clearly recalls the way in which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. This sort of language returns repeatedly. For example, in the medium point there is a trace of the creativity of the divine Trinity (p. 40), and in the three circles which represent the extremes and the middle term, one can perceive the mystery of the Trinity (p. 51). Although Chapters 4, 6, and 7 in particular emphasize the violence of opposition, the final chapters return to emphasizing circles, the triad, and the middle term, which can be described using Trinitarian language. 36 Thus, while the dyad of opposites might imply violence, this violence is apparently redeemed by the triad which is much more positively conceived. While difference occasionally appears detrimental, in the case of the human soul it resembles Trinitarian 'difference', and even in other cases implicitly bears some similarity to it. If all things cannot be quite so definitively created 'in the image of God' (Genesis 1. 26-27) as man was, they nonetheless seem to bear some trace of his image.
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Generic specificities and thinking about difference Thus the argument that Bovelles suppresses threatening conceptions of difference is difficult to ground in Bovelles's own writing. However, as we have seen, another early-sixteenth-century text -the Délie -shares some of Bovelles's apprehensions of difference yet tends to construe them with more negative implications, for the human subject in particular. Both the Ars and the Délie suggest that a powerful light or gaze might function to create surprising modes of difference but these often seem to be a source of suffering for the je in the Délie, whereas in Bovelles's Ars the human soul can, like the divine, enjoy a privileged relation to difference and to knowledge; in the Ars the Trinitarian 'difference' of the divine appears to be imaged in the human soul and, to some extent, in the natural world.
The Délie, of course, presents an imagined universe with a central role for a cruel lady-goddess rather than for a generous God; thus it is unsurprising that its presentation of difference contrasts with the Trinitarian one of Bovelles, for whom human cognition cannot be dissociated from God's gift of a downward divine movement. 38 Whereas the human subject in the Ars has a positive experience of difference because of his relationship with the angelic and the divine, the 'divinity' of the Délie inflicts difference rather than redeeming it. Therefore we might add to my earlier suggestions of generic specificities which shape the possible conceptions of difference that can be 'thought' within particular genres: the generically specific presentation of divinity appears to be crucial. 39 In the hands of Bovelles and Scève, the divergent genres of Latin prose philosophy and vernacular love lyric both explore paradoxical conceptions of 'opposition' which muddy distinctions between antithetical modes of difference and other kinds, and between cognition and causality; yet, while Bovelles's Latin prose tends to celebrate a mode of difference which recalls that of the Trinity, Scève's love lyric often points to an anxiety about difference within the human subject.
